Yi Mei Zhu v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-1-2017 
Yi Mei Zhu v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Yi Mei Zhu v. Attorney General United States" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 202. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/202 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-3181 
_____________ 
 
YI MEI ZHU 
JIE JIANG, 
                    Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                      Respondent 
 _____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
BIA Nos. A095-843-938 & A095-843-939 
Immigration Judge: Hon. R.K. Malloy 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 23, 2017 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, RESTREPO, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 1, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioners Yi Mei Zhu and Jie Jiang seek review of a June 29, 2016 decision of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying their second motion to reopen their 
applications for asylum, which were originally denied on January 12, 2009.  We will 
deny the petition for review. 
I. 
 Zhu and Jiang are wife and husband, and natives and citizens of China who 
entered the United States without being admitted or paroled.  A.R. 1360, 2284, 2234.  
They first applied for Asylum and Withholding of Removal and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) on August 30, 2002 and December 8, 2003.  A.R. 
1822-39; 2211-19.  Those applications were based on the fear of persecution under 
China’s one-child policy if the applicants were to return to China.  A.R. 2222.  Zhu 
claimed that she feared forced sterilization if removed to China because she had violated 
the one-child policy.  A.R. 1833-41.   
An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied the applications on October 23, 2006 as 
untimely and for failing to meet the required burden of proof, noting that documentary 
evidence and applicants’ testimony were inconsistent and not credible.  A.R. 1308-40.  
The BIA dismissed the appeal of the IJ’s decision on January 12, 2009.  A.R. 1243.  
On September 13, 2013, Zhu and Jiang filed a first motion to reopen, alleging 
changed country conditions regarding family planning policy and regarding a new basis 
for asylum — persecution of underground Christians in China.  A.R. 79.  As to the latter 
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basis, they asserted that there had been an increase in persecution of house church 
Christians (who worship at unregistered Protestant churches in China) since 2008 and 
that they feared persecution because they are Christian.  A.R. 84-85.  The BIA denied the 
motion to reopen on February 12, 2014, concluding that Zhu and Jiang did not establish a 
material change in circumstances or country conditions to justify reopening the case.  
A.R. 55-58.  In its decision, the BIA noted that the claim of religious persecution rested 
solely on evidence that some leaders of underground churches had been arrested and that 
church members were harassed.  These facts, the BIA concluded, were insufficient to 
establish changed country conditions.  A.R. 57.  Zhu and Jiang appealed, and the 
Government agreed to remand the case to the BIA to address the specific evidence 
submitted in light of Fei Yan Zhu v. Attorney Gen., 744 F.3d 268, 279 (3d Cir. 2014), 
where we reiterated that the BIA should meaningfully address specific documents 
presented by petitioners.  See A.R. 55-58; Zhu v. Att’y Gen., No. 14-1473 (3d. Cir.).  
On remand, the BIA again denied the motion to reopen on November 5, 2014.  
Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 30-35.  The BIA concluded that as to the forced 
sterilization issue, there were no recent reports of such activities in their home province, 
and that any isolated abuses in their home province did not show that the respondents 
themselves will be targeted.  A.R. 34.  As to the religious persecution issue, the BIA 
found that documents submitted by Zhu and Jiang only reflected that targeting members 
of unregistered Christian churches had intensified in China generally, but not in their 
home province of Fujian.  A.R. 35.   
4 
 
Zhu and Jiang filed a petition for review with the Third Circuit, but did not raise 
any challenges to the BIA’s findings relating to religious persecution.  Their petition was 
denied.  Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 641 F. App’x 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2016). 
On May 9, 2016, Zhu and Jiang filed a second motion to reopen.  A.R. 16-18.  
Along with the motion, they attached two articles by the nonprofit organization 
ChinaAid, which describe the demolition of a Christian church in 2016 for “failure to 
register with the local government” and government personnel “haul[ing] away Christian 
protesters away from the wreckage.”  A.R. 23, 25.  The BIA denied this motion on June 
29, 2016, noting that the “single incident, standing alone,” is insufficient, as “[t]he 
articles do not establish that anyone was injured during these events, and we are not 
persuaded that the destruction of this church building and removal of protesters from the 
area is sufficiently severe to constitute materially changed country conditions or 
circumstances . . . .”  A.R. 3-4.   
Zhu and Jiang timely filed a petition for review of the BIA’s decision denying the 
second motion to reopen. 
II. 
The BIA had jurisdiction to review the motion to reopen pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2.  We have jurisdiction over a timely filed petition for review under 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1252(a)(1), 1252(b)(1).  “We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of 
discretion.”  Fei Yan Zhu, 744 F.3d at 271–72.  The BIA’s discretion over motions to 
reopen is broad and “will not be disturbed unless they are found to be arbitrary, irrational, 
or contrary to law.”  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004), as amended 
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(Dec. 3, 2004) (quoting Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir.1994)).  We review the 
BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard.  See Korytnyuk v. 
Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 283 (3d Cir. 2005); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (providing 
that findings of fact are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary”). 
III. 
Zhu and Jiang’s petition to reopen is based on changed country conditions.  
Generally, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative 
decision.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  However, a motion to reopen based on “changed 
circumstances arising in the country of nationality” based on “evidence [that] is material 
and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous 
hearing” may be filed after the 90-day period has elapsed.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  
To succeed on such a motion to reopen, the applicant must show prima facie eligibility 
for asylum — a “realistic chance that the petitioner can at a later time establish that 
asylum should be granted.”  Guo, 386 F.3d at 564.   
The basis for Zhu and Jiang’s motion to reopen is that in 2016, a Christian church 
in their home province of Fujian was demolished for failure to register with the 
government, and government officials removed protestors from the demolition scene.1  
                                              
1  Zhu and Jiang’s assertions that they would not be allowed to worship openly if 
they returned to China is not an issue that is properly before us.  See Zhu & Jiang Br. 5-6.  
In this petition, we review only the question of whether the BIA abused its discretion in 
concluding that the two ChinaAid articles do not constitute sufficient basis for a material 
change in country conditions and thus merit reopening the case. 
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The BIA determined that this single instance of demolition did not amount to a material 
change in country conditions.  Although the BIA’s 2014 decision noted that Zhu and 
Jiang failed to provide any evidence of even a single instance of harassment in Fujian, 
that they now present evidence of the 2016 incident does not necessarily establish a 
material change in country conditions.2  We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the 2016 evidence did not fulfill Zhu and Jiang’s burden of 
presenting material evidence of changes in country conditions that was not previously 
available, discoverable, or presentable.   
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Zhu and Jiang’s petition for review of the 
BIA order dated June 29, 2016.   
                                              
2  Zhu and Jiang also argue that the BIA erred in requiring that they show physical 
injury.  The BIA did not impose such a requirement, but merely made that observation in 
the context of concluding that the events described in the ChinaAid article were not 
sufficient.  See A.R. 4. 
